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Abstract
Unstructured texts are a very popular data type and still widely un-
explored in the privacy preserving data mining field. We consider the
problem of providing public information about a set of confidential docu-
ments. To that end we have developed a method to protect a Vector Space
Model (VSM), to make it public even if the documents it represents are
private. This method is inspired by microaggregation, a popular protec-
tion method from statistical disclosure control, and adapted to work with
sparse and high dimensional data sets.
1 Introduction
In the last years, the quantity of stored personal information has been increasing
exponentially and it has created a problem of privacy due to the inherent tension
in mining those sensitive data bases. Since that, research fields such as privacy
preserving data mining has got an important role in the community and a
number of different methods have been proposed for privacy preserving data
mining. Although, sanitization methods explicitly remove identifiers like names,
phone numbers, addresses, etc., they are not enough to protect individual’s
privacy. Therefore, we should delete other additional information so an attacker
cannot infer an identity or other sensitive information about an individual based
on the remainder information.
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In this paper we address the problem of how to release a set of confidential
documents without giving away sensitive information that can be linked to spe-
cific individuals and also achieved with the minimum loss of information. Given
a set of confidential, and thus, private documents we want to provide some pub-
lic metadata to be used for analysis and mining, which preserves the privacy
or the anonymity with respect to the original documents. To address the prob-
lem we have relied on a well known data representation of a set of documents,
the Vector Space Model (VSM) [34], which is widely used in information re-
trieval and text mining. Following these ideas our proposal can be summarized
as providing a secure VSM, which closely represents a set of documents while
preserving the anonymity of the documents. The protected VSM can be made
public, while the original documents are kept secret. This allows to perform
some information retrieval and text mining tasks on the set of documents while
preserving the privacy of the documents.
It is important to clarify what do we consider as private information with
respect to a set of documents. In this work we have focused to the concrete
protection of the document owner, creator, or the entity to which the document
is explicitly related. We try to prevent the ability of an attacker to correctly link
a given document (or document representation) to a concrete entity (individual,
organization, . . . ). That is, depending on the protection purpose, we want to
avoid the possible link an attacker can establish between a document and its
writer, or on the other hand, we also want to avoid the possible link an attacker
can establish between a document and the entity which it is about. We will
discuss several possible scenarios that present this particularity or threat, some
clear examples are a set of health patient records, research project proposals,
individual posts to a private internet forum, . . .
To achieve the protection of the VSM we rely in the k-anonymity prop-
erty [35, 39]. Our proposal provides a protection method that yields a k-
anonymous VSM. As we will see, this will ensure that at least k vectors (docu-
ment representations) in the VSM are equal to each other providing an upper
bound on the probability to link an entity to the specific document.
1.1 Motivation
To better shape our proposal we present here three motivating scenarios. In
short, the presented anonymization technique is suitable for scenarios involving
a set of confidential documents in which each document is directly or indirectly
related to one or a set of different entities. A direct relation is when the doc-
ument contains sensitive information of the specific person or institution that
must be anonymized, while an indirect relation is when the document does not
contain explicit information about the entity to be anonymized, but also there
is an implicit relation between the entity and the document that can be inferred
through some other document properties. We describe three cases where our
proposal has a direct application.
Private textual datasets for generic research. A clear application scenario
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is within the research community, in the information retrieval and text
mining fields. Several organizations present their research at scientific
journals or conferences. Usually, the experiments presented showing their
improvements and validating their research are done over some private
datasets. However, when other researchers want to reproduce those ex-
periments it becomes impossible, since the datasets are private and can
contain confidential information. Examples are a set of patient health
records, user posts to a private Internet forum, a set of user profiles from
a social network, or even a set of user queries made to a search engine
(recall the infamous AOL search data leak [8]).
A possible solution is to publish an anonymized data that represents the
original dataset and can be used to reproduce to some extent the research
made on the original dataset. This is straightforward in text mining re-
search where the VSM is frequently used to represent a set of documents,
but other similar data structures can be envisioned with the same purpose
for more specific tasks.
Private profiling data for advertising. Personalized online advertisement
is another possible area where anonymization should be considered. Lots
of web services are offering their services for free in exchange of intro-
ducing advertisements on their services. Google, Twitter or Facebook are
some examples of companies, which collect and store thousands of users’
confidential information in order to analyze and offer targeted advertise-
ments [31, 36]. E-mails, user’s posts or even personal documents are some
clear examples. In some cases these data could be transferred to special-
ized companies, which analyze all data in order to define advertisement
strategies in a user base.
These user data might be considered confidential, and might not be di-
rectly transferable to other parties. Therefore, the solution is to anonymize
the data before its transference. The idea behind this approach is that
the advertisement company will not be able to distinguish a unique user
from a set of k of them. Hence, the advertisements selected for a single
user are actually extracted from a mix of several user’s profiles.
Anonymized metadata from public tender. As a last example, we can con-
sider for instance a government agency managing applications to public
research project funding. Such applications should be kept private, but
at the same time it can be interesting to be able to give some information
about the applications and more precisely of the projects presented by the
applicants. This becomes specially difficult if we assume that the projects
are written in a free-form text. This information is interesting not only to
the community applying for funding but also to the administration and
politicians. We are looking for information such as: “this geographic area
applies for projects about this topic”, or “this methodology is proposed by
a given percentage of researchers from these given topics”. While this in-
formation can be valuable it normally does not reveal specific and private
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information.
1.2 Contributions and plan of the paper
The major contributions of this paper are as follows. We provide a new approach
for the anonymization of very sparse and high-dimensional data sets. We con-
tinue and improve the work presented in [3], in which the authors presented a
first microaggregation approach for the anonymization of document space vec-
tors. We propose an adaptation in the partition and aggregation functions of
microaggregation in order to improve the data quality of the output protected
data. That is, the anonymization method has to protect an original data set
ensuring the entities’ confidentiality and achieve it with the lowest loss of in-
formation, so that this anonymous data could reflect as much as possible the
original data distribution. Therefore, given that microaggregation is a distance
based clustering approach we propose to use the cosine dissimilarity, instead
of the Euclidean distance, in order to find a better partition for sparse data
sets. Moreover, we also improve the way clusters’ representatives should be
computed. A cluster representative is the vector which is the closest in terms of
cosine distance (in average) to all data vectors belonging to its respective parti-
tion. A mathematical proof is provided to support our proposition. Finally, the
evaluation of the method is conducted by performing a large set of experiments
on two different sparse and high-dimensional data sets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of the literature related to anonymization of textual data. Section 3 introduces
preliminaries for the set of documents preprocessing and its representation as a
VSM, as well as the definition of what we consider in this work as an anonymous
VSM. In Section 4 we present a brief introduction to the classical microaggrega-
tion algorithm and our proposal to anonymize VSMs. In Section 5 we provide
an evaluation of our proposal. Data is described and analyzed before and after
its corresponding anonymization. These evaluations are performed by means of
different traditional information retrieval techniques. Finally, the conclusions
are given in Section 6.
2 Related Work
There are two existing work areas related to text-based documents protection.
The first one, and probably the best known, is the single document sanitization,
such technique is needed while declassifying documents involving sensitive or
confidential information, such as names, telephones, etc. The second research
line, most related to ours, is the document anonymization while preserving text
mining. So, as text mining primary task is the development of models, with
the anonymized texts sets we will be able to develop accurate models which are
similar to models developed with original text sets.
Document sanitization consist of two tasks. The detection of sensitive data
within the text and then, the hiding or deletion of such detected information,
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with the aim of minimizing the disclosure risk, while causing the least distortion
to the document content. The first task is usually solved by using Named Entity
Recognition and Classification systems, such as [37, 32]. The second task has
been developed in different ways. Chakaravarthy et al. [9] presented the ERASE
(Efficient RedAction for Securing Entities), a system for preforming document
sanitization automatically based on entities suppression. Perturbation was also
a solution for hiding personal identity information employed in [32]. In [7], the
author used an ontology to replace sensitive nouns with other words semantically
more general.
The literature concerning to the second line of research, textual data anonymiza-
tion preserving a certain degree of mining, follows the research direction of two
more established disciplines, as are Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) [43]
and Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) [6]. They provide a set of protec-
tion techniques for statistical data sets, microdata, that preserve data mining
and also a set of measures to evaluate disclosure risk [40] and information loss
[12, 1] of protected data.
Recently, several research works have been interested in the protection of
text-based data sets while preserving text mining. Relying on the basic anonymiza-
tion principles stated by PPDM and SDC, those works have presented either
new or modified existing protection techniques for textual data. Most of them
were geared towards the problem of anonymizing search engine query logs after
the highly publicized case in 2006, were AOL in an attempt to help the infor-
mation retrieval research community released several million search queries to
the public after performing a very simplistic anonymization. However, through
analysis of text and linking attributes from the queries to public data, one user
was re-identified [8]. For instance, in [26] the authors argued that removing
some queries from the log does not preserve and acceptable privacy degree and
they present a technique for query-anonymization, they ensure the k-anonymity
in query logs by aggregating them. In the same direction, Erola et al. [16]
introduced a variation of the microaggregation method, which enforced user k-
anonymity by taking into account the semantic similarity between user queries
relying on a hierarchical ontology, such as the Open Directory Project (ODP).
The cluster representatives are made by selecting specific queries form each
user in the group, that is, queries that are semantically close and/or that are in
deeper ODP levels.
Other related works have been focused on semantic microaggregation vari-
ations by means of introducing external knowledge databases, such as Word-
Net [25], a hierarchical ontology of English words. The authors in [2] exploit
WordNet to group the most similar attribute sets according to the similarity
of their meanings. Then, each group is represented by a centroid, which is the
taxonomical common ancestor of all the grouped terms. (e.g., truck < motor ve-
hicle). Improving some drawbacks in that paper, authors in [23, 24] extend the
microaggregation algorithm to support non-numerical (categorical) attributes
defining an appropriate distance and aggregation operator. They introduce a
weighted semantic distance and an aggregation operator that integrates the
distribution and the semantics of the data.
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In [20] the authors focused on preserving privacy in publishing vocabular-
ies, that is, very sparse bag-valued data extracted from a web query log. They
extend the k-anonymity principle to ensure that every vocabulary for a given
granularity is indistinguishable from at least k− 1 other vocabularies, they call
this principle vocabulary k-anonymity. They proposed a semantic similarity
based on clustering for retaining enough data utility, relying on the minimum
path distance over a semantic network, such as WordNet, between a pair of
terms. Unlike previous authors, they substituted the terms with semantic simi-
lar terms, because they stated that for sparse data the generalization operation
suffers from a high loss of information.
Unlike the previous research studies, we focus our work on the protection
of vector spaces (i.e., texts are mapped onto document-term matrices), which
are supported by lots of traditional information retrieval and data mining anal-
ysis algorithms. These text mappings lead to very sparse and high-dimensional
data matrices and, although the application of anonymization to vector spaces
is recent, other researchers have also been focused towards the anonymization
of high-dimensional spaces. Ghinita et al. [17] proposed an anonymization
technique which combines the advantages of both generalization and permuta-
tion whose main idea is to first group closer transactions and then associate each
group to a set of diversified sensitive values. Lasko and Vinterbo [19] introduced
the term spectral anonymization to refer to an algorithm that uses a spectral
basis for anonymization instead of an original data. They also presented two
spectral anonymization examples, one based on data swapping and the other
based on Recursive Histogram Sanitization, a microaggregation method.
Our proposal relies in k-anonymity to ensure a certain degree of privacy.
The protected data is completely k-anonymous in the sense that there are k
vectors completely undistinguishable. Therefore, contrary to other works on
k-anonymity, there is no need for additional protection mechanisms regarding
unprotected sensitive attributes such as l-diversity [22]. This ensures that re-
identification algorithms [4, 27] will have a re-identification probability bounded
by k.
In this paper, we have continued the work started in [3], in which the authors
present a very first approach for vector space models anonymization based on
MDAV [13], a microaggregation method. Although, they decided to use the co-
sine distance to determine the similarity of two vectors, their proposed method
generates all centroids by computing the mean of all vectors within each parti-
tion. However, none of these centroids minimize the sum of distances between
itself and all the vectors contained in its corresponding partition. For this rea-
son, we propose and prove how these centroids should be computed in order to
equally represent all the elements of a cluster.
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3 Document Representation: towards a privacy
preserving VSM
A bag-of-words is a simplified document representation that considers a docu-
ment as an unordered collection of words. Take into account that unlike a set
of words, a bag-of-words allow word duplicates. Neither the original word order
nor the word syntax and grammar are considered. However, this fact makes
the representation a very simple model, which can be easily extended by means
of extracting different term-weights for each of the words in a document. The
objective of such weighting representation is to enhance discrimination between
various document vectors and to enhance retrieval effectiveness [33].
Each document can be represented as a term-weight vector and therefore
the whole collection of unstructured texts is represented as a document-term
matrix, where the rows are the documents and the columns are the weights
corresponding to the relevance of each term in each document. This represen-
tation is called the Vector Space Model (VSM) and it is commonly used in the
information retrieval and computer vision areas due to the ease to operate with
vectors. The VSM is a simple model based on linear algebra, which allows the
computation of continuous distances between documents, ranking them in order
of relevance to a given query, partial matching, . . .
As previously described our proposal introduces an anonymization process
for the VSM. In the following section we describe how the VSM is obtained and
what do we understand by an anonymous VSM.
3.1 Document processing
Figure 1 shows the document preprocessing steps. In order to represent each
document as a vector of terms, the documents are read and tokenized. However,
not all the words included in a document are useful when using text classifica-
tion or information retrieval techniques. These words, called stop-words, are
removed. Moreover, we consider an additional step in the cleaning process. It
consists in removing all the words which are not in the WordNet ontology [25]
(note that we will be dealing with English texts). This last step adds a simple
additional protection level by removing words, which are proper names or very
specific terms of a particular field. In case that the analysis to be carried on
the text data requires such words this step can safely be removed since the pro-
tection method that we have developed ensures k-anonymity on the resulting
VSM.
Once all documents are cleaned, we decide to apply two feature reduction
measures. Firstly, we remove all words with two or less letters and secondly, we
apply the Porter stemming algorithm [30]. This algorithm considers all words
with the same stem as the same word, producing a reduction in the size of the
feature set. Note that these feature reduction measures are not compulsory,
so data owners should decide its application depending on their data sets and
goals.
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Figure 1: Document preprocessing techniques.
The document vectorization is done by means of selecting a value/weight to
represent the relevance of each word within a document or collection of docu-
ments. There are different ways to measure the relevance of words, such as a
binary representation, the frequency of each word, the information gain, etc. We
have used the term frequency-inverse document frequency, known as tf-idf [21].
The tf-idf increases proportionally to the number of times a term appears in a
document, but it is countered by the frequency that term appears in the text
collection, also called corpus. Equation 1 shows the relation between the term
frequency of a term in a single document and the frequency of the term in the
corpus. That is,
tf-idf(t, d,D) = tf(t, d) log
|D|
| {d ∈ D : t ∈ d} | (1)
where t is a term of the corpus, d is a document and D is the set of documents.
tf(t, d) denotes the raw frequency of a term in a document.
In the VSM model it is beneficial to abstract out the magnitude of the term
weights because it takes out the influence of the document length: only the
relative weights across documents are important and not how big the document
is. For that reason each document can be normalized to have unit norm, same
direction but with length 1. That is, the division of each of the document vector,
~di, by its L
2-norm:
~v′ =
~di
‖~di‖
=
~di√∑
j
~di
2
j
(2)
The last step is the feature selection. This is a useful step when we are
dealing with a big corpus and a reduction of features can improve the model.
Therefore, the features, in our case all the vocabulary terms, are sorted in terms
of the given weights and the most relevant ones are selected while the others
are discarded.
Finally, the set of all document vectors can be seen as a document-term
matrix, where the rows represent each document and the columns are the cor-
responding term weights.
3.2 Anonymous VSM
The purpose of our work is to provide an anonymous or privacy-preserving
version of a given VSM, so it satisfies the k anonymity property with respect to
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document owners or entities to which the document is related.
In this sense we define a k-anonymous VSM as follows.
Definition 1. A VSM is said to satisfy k-anonymity if for every vector ~v in
V SM , there are at least k − 1 vectors equals to ~v.
This is preformed by means of constructing groups of indistinguishable k
records, in which the statistical characteristics of these groups are used to gen-
erate a group representative that is used for data mining purposes. Although,
such representative records do not represent the true data vectors, they are use-
ful for most modelling purposes, since they reflect the original distribution of
the records.
For instance, imagine a VSM representing a set of patient records, where
each row corresponds to a unique patient. Its k-anonymous VSM version will
have a certain number of sets with k indistinguishable patients. Therefore, the
probability of linking a given record to a given patient is bounded by the selected
k.
4 Anonymization of the VSM
Our method to anonymize the VSM is based on microaggregation, which is a
popular method used in SDC and PPDM. The idea behind microaggregation
is to modify statistical data so they can be released and analyzed by third
parties without giving away sensitive information that can be linked to specific
individuals and in addition this modification should ensure the minimum loss
of information as possible.
Section 4.1 explains the microaggregation algorithm and in Section 4.2 we
introduce our proposed microaggregation variation to anonymize sparse and
high-dimensional models, such as the presented vector spaces model.
4.1 Microaggregation
Microaggregation is a well known anonymization technique that provides privacy
by means of partition the data into small clusters and then replacing the original
data by the representatives of the corresponding clusters.
Privacy is achieved ensuring that all clusters have at least a predefined num-
ber of elements, say k to the number of values and, therefore, there are at least
k records with the same value and hence k indistinguishable records. Note that
all records in a specific cluster are replaced by the corresponding representa-
tive/centroid values of this cluster.
Microaggregation was originally [10] defined for numerical attributes, but
later extended to other domains, e.g., to categorical data in [41] (see also [14]),
and in constrained domains in [42].
From the operational point of view, microaggregation is defined in terms of
partition and aggregation:
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• Partition: Records are partitioned into several clusters, each of them
consisting of at least k records.
• Aggregation: For each of the clusters a representative (the centroid) is
computed, and then original records are replaced by the representative of
the cluster to which they belong to.
From a formal point of view, microaggregation can be defined as an optimiza-
tion problem with some constraints, so it should minimize the information loss
resulting from this replacement process, in other words, the difference between
all the elements of each cluster (xj) and its corresponding centroid (vi) should
be as minimum as possible. We give a formalization below using uij to describe
the partition of the records in the sensitive data set X with n records. That is,
uij = 1 if record j is assigned to the ith cluster. Let vi be the representative
(centroid) of the ith cluster, then a general formulation of microaggregation
with g clusters and a given k is as follows:
Minimize
∑g
i=1
∑n
j=1 uij(d(xj , vi))
2
Subject to
∑g
i=1 uij = 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n
2k ≥∑nj=1 uij ≥ k for all i = 1, . . . , g
uij ∈ {0, 1}
For numerical data it is usual to require that d(x, v) is the Euclidean distance.
In the general case, when attributes V = (V1, . . . , Vs) are considered, x and v
are vectors, and d becomes d2(x, v) =
∑
Vi∈V(xi − vi)2. In addition, it is also
common to require for numerical data that vi is defined as the arithmetic mean of
the records in the cluster. That is, vi =
∑n
j=1 uijxi/
∑n
j=1 uij . As the solution
of this problem is NP-Hard [28] when we consider more than one variable at a
time (multivariate microaggregation), heuristic methods have been developed.
MDAV [13] (Maximum Distance to Average Vector) is one of such existing
algorithms. It is explained in detail in Algorithm 1, when applied to a data set X
with n records and A attributes. The implementation of MDAV for categorical
data is given in [14].
Note that when all variables are considered at once, microaggregation is a
way to implement k-anonymity [35, 39].
4.2 Spherical Microaggregation
In this section we present which changes should be applied to the classic mi-
croaggregation algorithm in order to obtain better results when it is dealing
with sparse and high-dimensional data, such as vector spaces.
It was shown in the previous section that microaggregation works as a
distance-based clustering algorithm. However, it was defined to work with low-
dimensional and dense data and therefore, our goal is to extend its functionality
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Algorithm 1: MDAV
Data: X: original data set, k: integer
Result: X’: protected data set
1 begin
2 while (|X| ≥ 3 ∗ k) do
3 Compute average record x¯ of all records in X;
4 Consider the most distant record xr to the average record x¯;
5 Form a cluster around xr. The cluster contains xr together with
the k − 1 closest records to xr;
6 Remove these records from data set X;
7 Find the most distant record xs from record xr;
8 Form a cluster around xs. The cluster contains xs together with
the k − 1 closest records to xs;
9 Remove these records from data set X;
10 if (|X| >= 2 ∗ k) then
11 Compute the average record x¯ of all records in X;
12 Consider the most distant record xr to the average record x¯;
13 Form a cluster around xr. The cluster contains xr together with
the k − 1 closest records to xr;
14 Remove these records from data set X;
15 Form a cluster with the remaining records;
to vector space models of large document collections, or in other words, very
sparse and high-dimensional models.
It is well known how in distance-based clustering algorithms the use of dif-
ferent distances lead to different data partitions and so, depending on the data
type used one distance can obtain better results than others. Strehl et al. [38]
or Dihllon and Modha [11] demonstrate that Euclidean distance is a weak dis-
criminant when data is multidimensional and sparse. Therefore, in order to
adapt the microaggregation algorithm a new distance function has to be con-
sidered, and as a consequence, we are forced to modify the aggregation function
to another that fits better with the considered distance. That is, the resultant
aggregated vector, or centroid, should minimize the sum of distances between
all the cluster members and itself.
To do so, we have focused on the spherical k-means clustering algorithm,
presented by Dihllon and Modha [11], due to its similarities with the presented
problem. Their objective was to adapt the k-means clustering algorithm results
for vector spaces by means of using the cosine similarity and an aggregation
function that computes the best representative for a given cluster, according to
the cosine similarity.
In the next sections the necessary modifications to adapt the microaggrega-
tion to vector spaces are explained. Section 4.2.1 introduces the cosine similarity
and in Section 4.2.2 is presented the algorithm aggregation function and also its
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mathematical proof.
4.2.1 Distance function
We assume that all document vectors have been normalized using L2-norm, as
described in Equation (2). This means that vectors can be represented on a
high dimensional unit sphere. Furthermore, for most of the weighting schemes
all the document vectors are non-negative, and hence all document vectors can
be represented in the first quadrant of the unit sphere. For those vectors, the
dot product is a natural measure of similarity. This measure is known as cosine
similarity and it is widely used in text mining and information retrieval due to
its easy interpretation and simple computation for sparse vectors. The similarity
between two given document vectors, ~d1 and ~d2, is given by:
scos(d1, d2) = cos(θ( ~d1, ~d2)) =
〈 ~d1, ~d2〉
| ~d1|| ~d2|
(3)
where 〈 ~d1, ~d2〉 and θ( ~d1, ~d2) are the inner product and the angle between these
two vectors, respectively.
The resulting similarity ranges from −1 meaning exactly opposite vectors, to
1 meaning exactly the same. However, as we have assumed non-negative vectors
the similarity ranges from 0 to 1. The maximum similarity, 1, is achieved when
there is a complete match between both vectors, and the minimum, 0, when
both vectors are orthogonal, that is the angle between both vectors is 90◦.
It is easy to transform Equation 3 into a distance dcos (Equation 4). Note
that vector norms are removed from the equation because we have assumed
magnitude 1 for all the document vectors.
dcos( ~d1, ~d2) = 1− 〈 ~d1, ~d2〉 (4)
4.2.2 Aggregation function
The aggregation step is defined by a function that given a partition of document
vectors, pij , returns the corresponding representative vector, cj , which in average
is closest, in terms of cosine similarity, to all document vectors belonging to that
partition.
Given a set of non negative document vectors, ~d1, . . . , ~dN , which have unit
norm and a set of p disjoint clusters on the vectors, pi1, . . . , pip, Dhillon and
Modha [11] proposed to compute the centroid of each pij first computing the
vector ~mj as follows,
~mj =
1
Nj
∑
di∈pij
~di, (5)
where Nj is the number of document vectors in the cluster pij . And, then, as
the resulting vector does not have a unit norm they define the centroid of pij
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normalizing the vector by its L2 norm. That is:
~cj =
~mj
‖ ~mj‖ (6)
Proposition 1. Let S be the set of vectors in the unit sphere and let pij be a
cluster containing a set of documents vectors ~d1, . . . , ~dN ∈ S. The average
vector of S defined by
C( ~d1, . . . , ~dN ) = argmin~cj∈S{
∑
~di∈pij
dcos(~cj , ~di)} (7)
can be computed using the following expression
C( ~d1, . . . , ~dN ) =
∑
~di∈pij
~dir√∑R
r=1(
∑
~di∈pij
~dir)2)
. (8)
where R is the number of dimensions of the vectors.
Proof. Starting from the assumption that all the elements have a unit norm,
including the centroid, we can express the cosine distance as the half of the
squared euclidean distance.
‖~di − ~dj‖2 = (~di − ~dj)T (~di − ~dj)
= ‖~di‖2 + ‖~dj‖2 − 2~di
T ~dj
= 2(1− cos(θ(~di, ~dj)))
so,
dcos(di, dj) =
1
2
‖~di − ~dj‖2 (9)
We can express the minimization problem, stated in Equation 7 and its
corresponding constraint, ‖~cj‖ = 1, by means of Lagrange multipliers,
L =
1
2
∑
~di∈pij
||~cj − ~di||2 − λ(~cjT ~cj − 1).
We can rewrite this expression in terms of the components:
L =
1
2
∑
~di∈pij
R∑
r=1
(~cjr − ~dir)2 − λ(
R∑
r=1
~cj
2
r − 1)
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In order to obtain an expression for ~cj , we obtain an expression for each
dimension of it , ~cjr, using
∂L
∂ ~cjr
= 0. That is,
∂L
∂~cjr
=
∑
~di∈pij
1
2
2(~cjr − ~dir)(1)− λ2~cjr = 0, ∀ r = 1 . . . R
From this expression, we get
−
∑
~di∈pij
~dir + ~cjr|pij | − 2λ~cjr = 0, ∀ r = 1 . . . R,
Therefore, each dimension of ~cj is expressed as follows,
~cjr =
∑
~di∈pij
~dir
|pij | − 2λ , ∀ r = 1 . . . R. (10)
Now, we consider ∂L∂λ = 0. That is,
∂L
∂λ
= −
(
R∑
r=1
~cj
2
r − 1
)
= 0.
Hence, using the expression in Equation 10, we get
R∑
r=1
(∑
~di∈pij
~dir
|pij | − 2λ
)2
= 1.
So,
R∑
r=1
(
∑
~di∈pij
~dir)
2 = (|pij | − 2λ)2.
So, in order to obtain λ, we have to solve the following second degree equa-
tion:
4λ2 − 4λ|pij |+ |pij |2 −
R∑
r=1
∑
~di∈pij
~dir
2 = 0
This results into the following expression for λ:
λ =
|pij | ±
√∑R
r=1(
∑
~di∈pij
~dir)2
2
.
If we replace now this expression for λ in Expression 10 we get for all r =
1 . . . R,
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~cjr =
∑
~di∈pij
~dir
|pij | − 2
 |pij |±√∑Rr=1(∑ ~di∈pij ~dir)2
2

=
∑
~di∈pij
~dir√∑R
r=1(
∑
~di∈pij
~dir)2)
.
As the last equation is the aggregation operator that returns the vector
which is closest in terms of the cosine distance (in average) to all document
vectors belonging to the cluster pij , we have proved the proposition. Note that
Expression 8 corresponds to the process described by Dhillon and Modha.
5 Experimental results
In this section, we evaluate the anonymous data generated by the presented
microaggregation variation. This assessment relies on a set of evaluation exper-
iments to estimate how much information has been lost by the anonymized data
with respect to the original and so to determine the utility of this anonymized
data. These evaluations are performed by means of a comparison between the
results obtained by the original data and its respective anonymizations when
different information retrieval techniques are applied.
We have divided this section in three different subsections. The first two,
5.1 and 5.2, describe the data sets used in the experiments before and after its
anonymization and in Section 5.3 we quantify how much information has been
lost after the anonymization process by analyzing the results obtained by a set
of machine learning techniques.
5.1 Original data
We have selected two well known datasets, the Reuters-21578 and the Movie
Reviews Corpus. The former, Reuters, is currently the most widely used test
collection for text categorization research. It consists of 10K documents classi-
fied in 52 different categories. To make it simple, we have avoided documents
which are related with more than one category, and also, we have reduced the
number of document features by means of removing the terms occurring in just
one document. This reduction is based on the assumption that rare words do
not affect category prediction. Hence, after these simplifications the corpus has
7346 documents classified in 7 different categories.
The latter, Movie Reviews, is a collection of documents used for sentiment
analysis, so all documents are labeled with respect to their sentiment polarity
(positive or negative). It consists on 2000 movie reviews, classified on 1000
positive reviews and 1000 negative reviews. As in the Reuters corpus, we have
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applied a feature selection process relying on the deletion of the words appearing
just in one document.
In Section 5.3.3 we used two different supervised classification methods to
estimated the quality of the protected models with respect to the original ones.
Therefore, data should be split in two sets, training and test data. Hence, both
data sets are divided with a proportion 70-30. The 70% is the training data
and the remaining 30% is the test data. In the case of the Reuters corpus this
partition is given by the data owners, otherwise, the Movie Reviews corpus has
been randomly partitioned. To simplify the data sets name, we will refer to
Reuters and Movie Reviews as R and MR, respectively. Besides, when we refer
to one of its partitions, we will add its corresponding subscript, tr and ts for
the training and test case respectively (e.g,. Rtr, Reuters training set).
Corpus Split N d Avg(dnz) K Balance
Reuters All 7346 5473 29.4 7 0.0131
Train 5255 5343 30.5 7 0.0152
Test 2091 4152 26.7 7 0.0093
Movie Review All 2000 12431 186.5 2 1
Train 1420 12188 185 2 0.96
Test 580 10479 190.3 2 0.91
Table 1: Summary of all vector spaces used. (For each dataset, N is the number
of documents, d is the number of words after removing stop-words, Avg(dnz) is
an average of the number of words per document, K is the total number of
classes and Balance is the ratio of the number of documents belonging to the
smallest class to the number of documents belonging to the largest class .)
A summary of all vector space models used in this paper is shown in Table 1.
In this table, besides the number of documents and words of the datasets used,
we show an indicator of the term-document matrix sparsity level by means of
an average of the non-zero weight terms (Avg(dnz)) and also the ratio of the
number of documents in the smallest class to the number of documents in the
largest class (Balance). So a value close to 1 indicates a very balanced data set
and a value close to 0 indicates completely the opposite.
In the histogram of Figure 2 we show two distance distributions by intervals
of 0.1. Black bars corresponds to the Reuters data set (R) and the grey ones
represent the distance distribution of the Movie Reviews data set (MR). At first
glance, it is clearly appreciable that almost all distances computed are located
in the intervals with higher distance values. Specifically, the 99.3% and 89.4%
of the distances are located in the two last intervals for the Movie Reviews
and Reuters data set, respectively. This means that most document vectors of
both data sets are far from each other in terms of cosine distance. Moreover,
if we focus on the last interval, with distance equal to one, we will realize that
while Movie Reviews has a percentage of almost zero, Reuters has much more
distances located in that interval and so, it has more document vectors with
non-overlapped terms. In detail, Reuters has the 57.9% of the distances in the
16
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Figure 2: Distance distribution by intervals.
[0.9, 1) interval and the 31.5% in the interval with distances equal to one. In
general MR vectors are much more scattered than the R vectors and as we will
see in the following sections, this fact has an important impact in the quality of
the protected data.
5.2 Anonymized data
In order to anonymize the data we have implemented the microaggregation
heuristic method MDAV, Algorithm 1, with the corresponding distance and
aggregation functions proposed in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. We have used the
implemented method to anonymize both datasets and their partitions indepen-
dently, the training and test sets. The fact of protecting independently the
training and test sets is because in Section 5.3.3 we have considered a set of
three different scenarios relaying on supervised learning techniques to evaluate
the quality of the protected data.
In addition, we have considered different values for the k microaggregation
parameter, which ranges from 2 to 20, and so for each original dataset we have
19 protected variations. Thereby, we will study the variation effects of this
parameter in order to decide which should be the best anonymization value.
All the protected datasets have the same number of documents. However, as
the k parameter is increased the anonymity clusters are growing and therefore
the protected vectors are increasing the number of words due to the aggrega-
tion operation. The sparsity of the vector space or term-document matrix is
decreased, or inversely, as it is shown in Figure 3, the average of the number of
words reaches a maximum value when the protection degree is equal to 20. It
increases about a 5% in the Reuters case and about 16% in the Movie Reviews
17
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Figure 3: Average of the number of words with a non-zero weight.
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case. Furthermore, increasing the number of words per document also implies
a decrease in all vector weight values. This behavior is shown in Figure 4. Note
that in all plots the data point with k = 1 is referring to the original data.
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Figure 5: Distance distribution by intervals.
Figure 5 consists of a set of histograms for three different protection degrees,
k = {2, 3, 10, 20}, showing the distance distributions by intervals. If we com-
pare the original distribution, Figure 2, with the smallest protection degrees,
Figures 5a and 5b, we realize that both data sets show different behaviors. In
the Reuters case it is clearly appreciable the reduction of higher distances. In
particular, the interval with the highest distance has decreased from the 31.5%,
originally, to the 3.6% with k = 3, and most of those distances are spread in
lower intervals, such as in the [0.9, 1) interval. However, in the Movie Reviews
case, this effect is not happening despite the nature of the protection algorithm.
This fact give us an idea of how far are data vectors between them, since the
data representatives are as far as the real data vectors. In Figures 5c and 5d,
in which protection degrees are much higher than before, the nature of the
algorithm is more clear. As before, Reuters dataset shows a clear distance re-
distribution where higher distance values are decreasing in favor to the next
interval with lower distance values. Nevertheless, as in Movie Reviews almost
all distances were originally very high, the protected representatives are not as
19
accurate as in the Reuters corpus and this produces extreme changes on the
distance distributions.
5.3 Evaluation
As the presented anonymization algorithm is considered a general purposed pro-
tection technique (i.e., it is not known the intended use of the protected data),
we have selected a set of different but basic information retrieval techniques,
so different aspects of the anonymized data can be evaluated. This evaluation
is conducted by comparing the results obtained by the original data with the
results obtained by the protected data. Firstly, we use a basic clustering eval-
uation, relying on intra and inter cluster similarity; secondly, we provide an
evaluation by comparison of search query result sets; and finally, we consider an
evaluation by comparing result sets when different classification and clustering
techniques are performed.
5.3.1 Intra/Inter-cluster sum of errors
The first evaluation procedure is based on an internal measure, that is, a mea-
sure related to the objective function used in the protection method, the aver-
age cosine distance between clusters. Hence, we evaluate our microaggregation
method in terms of the intra-cluster sum of errors to evaluate the homogeneity
of the with-in clusters (SSE) and the between-groups cluster (SSA).
SSE =
g∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(dcos( ~dij , ~¯di)) (11)
where g is the number of groups and ni the number of vectors in the ith group,
so ni ≥ k and n =
∑g
i=1 ni. In the same way
~dij is the jth record in the ith
group and ~¯ id denotes the average data vector over the ith group. The lower
SSE, the higher the within-group homogeneity.
SSA =
g∑
i=1
ni(dcos( ~¯ id , ~¯d)) (12)
where ~¯d is the average vector over the whole set of n vectors. The higher SSA,
the lower the between-groups homogeneity.
The last measure is the normalized information loss, defined as the relation
between the sum of squares of with-in group and the total sum of squares. That
is,
IL =
SSE
SSE + SSA
(13)
The optimal k-partition is defined by the one that minimizes the SSE mea-
sure (i.e., maximizes the within-group homogeneity) and maximizes the SSA
measure (i.e, minimizes the between-group homogeneity).
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Figure 6: Information Loss.
Figure 6 shows the relation between the normalized information loss and
the protection degree k for the proposed microaggregation, Spherical microag-
gregation (Figure 6a) and the original microaggregation method (Figure 6b).
Each method was evaluated with its specific information loss measure, Equa-
tions (13) for the Spherical microaggregation and the equivalent equations based
on the Euclidean distance for the classical microaggregation (see [13] for further
details). As expected in both methods, data utility is decreasing as the protec-
tion degree is increasing. Moreover, in general, we can see that vector spaces
with more vectors (bigger datasets) have lost less information. Both the orig-
inal and the Spherical microaggregation have been used to protect the same
normalized datasets. As the data was normalized the Euclidean and the co-
sine distances are equivalent (see Equation (9)) and hence, both methods built
the same data partitions. However, unlike the original microaggregation, which
generates the cluster representatives using the mean vector, the Spherical mi-
croaggregation generates normalized cluster representatives and so, a normal-
ized protected dataset. This difference is relevant when we are dealing with
sparse data and so, we are not interested in preserving the magnitude of the
vectors. If we compare the information loss produced by both methods, we
see a significant improvement achieved by the Spherical microaggregation. As
we can appreciate in Figures 6a and 6b the information loss produced by the
Spherical microaggregation is always much lower than the one produced by the
original microaggregation. If we focus on the minimum and maximum informa-
tion loss values we see a significant difference. On the one hand, the Spherical
microaggregation obtained a minimum ratio of information loss of 0.17, while
the original microaggregation obtained a ratio of 0.31. On the other hand, the
Spherical microaggregation produced a maximum ratio of information loss of
0.65, while the maximum ratio of information loss produced by the original
microaggregation is about 0.95.
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q0 the n most frequent terms in the collection.
q1 the n less frequent terms in the collection.
q2 n random terms.
q3 n random terms.
q4 the n terms with higher average weight per document.
q5 the n terms with higher weight.
Table 2: Test queries.
5.3.2 Querying vector spaces
A common use of the VSM is to use it as an index to be queried. In order to
measure the loss of information introduced by our method we can compare the
results of querying the original vector space with the results obtained in the
protected versions.
To that end we have built a simple and generic index from each vector space
model, making use of an inverted index from the vector space and a cosine score.
An inverted index consists of a list of all the unique words that appear in any
document, and for each word, a list of the documents in which it appears. The
query is represented as a vector ~q from the vector space, and the search engine
returns a ranked list of documents, where the rank is determined by the cosine
distance between the query vector and the document vectors. See [21] for more
details. Notice that searching the same query in a set of inverted index built
from different vector spaces will return a result in almost the same time.
We have used 6 different queries described in Table 2. These are divided
in three different types. The first type, q0 and q1, are queries related with the
number of times a term appears in the corpus. The second type, q2 and q3,
are queries with terms extracted randomly from the corpus. And finally, the
third type of queries are related to the weight given to each word in the feature
selection step, in this case the weight is the tf − idf of each term.
The queries are fed to the search engine which returns a list of the r doc-
uments with the highest rank. And we compare the resulting list R from the
original vector space with the protected one R′ by means of the harmonic mean
between precision and recall. This measure is called F1-score and it is repre-
sented by Equation 14.
F1 = 2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
(14)
Figure 7 shows how the F1-score ratio has a decreasing tendency while the
protection degree, k, gets higher. The left hand side of this figure corresponds
to the results when the Reuters corpus is queried with queries of sizes 1, 3 and
5 and the right hand side corresponds to the results when the Movie Reviews
corpus is queried.
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(a) One-worded query (b) One-worded query
(c) Three-worded query (d) Three-worded query
(e) Five-worded query (f) Five-worded query
Figure 7: F1-Score ration of equal documents returned querying the original and
the protected data sets for different query lengths. The left column corresponds
to the results of the Reuters and the right column tho the Movie Reviews corpus.
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5.3.3 Classification
This last part is focused on the comparison of results given by different classifica-
tion and clustering algorithms, two widely extended techniques used within the
information retrieval and text mining field. As in the previous section, the data
utility evaluation is done by a comparison between the results obtained with
the original data and its protected version when a classification or a clustering
algorithm is performed. Two different metrics were used. For the classification
algorithms we have used the Jaccard index [29], which is defined as the size of
the intersection divided by the size of the union of two label sets. While for the
clustering algorithms we have used the Adjusted Rand Index [18]. The Rand
Index considers whether pairs of elements are in the same or different clusters
in two clustering partition (in our case, the cluster partitions obtained by the
original data and the protected data).
To evaluate the utility of the protected data, and taking into account that
both data sets are labeled, we have considered two well known classifier algo-
rithms: the K-Nearest Neighbors [15] and the Naive Bayes [21]. Besides, we have
also considered the well known K-Means clustering algorithm, more precisely
its spherical version [11].
In order to perform the evaluation by the classification algorithms two data
partitions are necessary, training and test. As it was explained in Section 5.1,
two partitions were extracted from the two initial corpus. So that for each cor-
pus there are 3 vector spaces, the whole vector space and its two corresponding
partitions, the training and the test sets. Then, all these data sets were inde-
pendently anonymized. Note, that in a reverse process, where the partitions are
done after data protection, some errors could be introduced due to a separation
of a k-anonymous cluster. These data partitions also allow us to define a set of
scenarios to estimate how much information has been lost in the anonymization
process.
Scenario 1. The algorithm is trained with an original training data partition
and then the model is tested with a protected test data partition. An
example of this scenario would be when the data owners build their model
from their original data. Then they can use this model to classify data
provided by a third party and thus anonymized. Results in Figure 8.
Scenario 2. The training and test partitions are extracted from the same pro-
tected data set. We assumed that the released protected data is totally
or partially labeled. Results in Figure 9.
Scenario 3. The algorithm is trained with a protected training data partition
and then the model is tested with an original test data partition. This
is probably the most strange scenario, however, we have considered it
because it provides a good evaluation of the protected data. That is, we
can evaluate how good is the model obtained from the protected data
when is compared with the one obtained from the original data. Results
in Figure 10.
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Figure 8: First scenario - KNN - BAYES
 0.5
 0.55
 0.6
 0.65
 0.7
 0.75
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Ja
cc
ar
d 
Si
m
ila
rit
y
k
Reuters - KNN-5
Reuters - KNN-10
Movie Reviews - KNN-5
Movie Reviews - KNN-10
(a) K-Nearest Neighbor
 0.5
 0.55
 0.6
 0.65
 0.7
 0.75
 0.8
 0.85
 0.9
 0.95
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
Ja
cc
ar
d 
Si
m
ila
rit
y
k
Reuters
Movie Reviews
(b) Naive Bayes
Figure 9: Second scenario - KNN - BAYES
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Figure 10: Third scenario - KNN - BAYES
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Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the results of the defined scenarios. In the left
hand side of all these figures are shown the KNN results using 5 and 10 as the
number of selected neighbors to decide the class of the tested document vector.
In the right hand side are the plots corresponding to the Bayes classification
results.
In the case of the clustering algorithm, the spherical k-means, we have just
evaluate Scenario 2, where the data owner releases the whole vector space after
being protected. Thus, the evaluation is expressed in terms of how different
are the anonymized clusters with respect to the original ones. The spherical
k-means experimental setup has been performed as follows.
We have executed the spherical k-means clustering for both original vector
spaces, Reuters and Movie Reviews, and also for all their 19 anonymized vari-
ations. For the k-means we have considered the number of clusters parameter
as 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 for all the executions. Besides, in order to avoid that
the algorithm converges to a local minimum we have repeated each execution
10 times and we have got the best cluster partition. In addition, since both
corpus are labeled, we have also considered using the number of different labels
as the number of clusters considered by the algorithm, which are 7 and 2 for the
Reuters and Movie Reviews, respectively. However, as it is shown in Figure 11
in both instances the cluster partition and the labels partition do not match,
especially in the Movie Reviews example.
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Figure 11: Spherical.
Figure 12 shows how similar are the cluster partitions, in terms of the ad-
justed rand index, between the original vector spaces and their respective 19th
protection variations. Although the Reuters results are not so bad the Movie
Reviews results are in some way surprising. However, this big difference between
the original clustering and the protected one is due to the distance between all
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Movie Reviews data vectors. As we have shown, in Figure 2 almost all dis-
tances between all data pairs were in the [0.9, 1) interval. This means that all
documents are dissimilar in terms of cosine distance, and therefore the centroids
built from each group are too general. Hence, the data distribution can limitate
the prefromance of a distance-based anonymization method. Note that this is
an extreme case, since we are considering 12000 features per vector. It is known
that extremely high dimensional data has problems with k-anonymity based
methods [5], which usually rely on distance functions.
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6 Conclusions
A Vector Space Model is an algebraic representation commonly used in infor-
mation retrieval to represent textual data as a term-document matrix. These
models are very high-dimensional and sparse, and present different challenges
such as the similarity computation. Many researches agree that the cosine simi-
larity works better in these cases. This similarity allows to provide more efficient
an accurate clustering for sparse vector spaces.
In this paper we have presented an approach for the anonymization of sparse
and high-dimensional vector spaces relying on the microaggregation method.
This is an anonymization technique which provides privacy by means of cluster-
ing data into small clusters and then replacing them by their representatives.
We have introduced a new partition and aggregation operations relaying on the
cosine distance instead of the Euclidean distance, which is usually employed in
the classical microaggregation. Although the partition step is relatively straight-
forward, for the aggregation we have provided a proof, which demonstrates that
27
the computed representative is the one that minimizes the sum of distances
between all the members of the cluster and the representative. In addition,
we have implemented a variation of the heuristic microaggregation algorithm,
MDAV, with the proposed modifications.
Our results show how in most of the presented evaluation tests the data is
highly useful, specially in the classification tests and the sum of error. The
results obtained by the traditional evaluation, sum of error, were satisfactory
despite the sparsity of the data, we have obtained less than a 50% of information
loss for protection degrees lowers than 10 for the Movie Reviews data sets, and
20 for the Reuters data sets. In addition, in the classification tests the prediction
results of protected data are quite similar to the ones obtained by the original
data. Specifically, the maximum error obtained by the highest protection degree
(k = 20) in the Reuters data is about a 20% and about a 15% in the Movie
Reviews. Otherwise, the results obtained by the clustering algorithm are much
more discouraging. The partitions obtained with the protected data are very
dissimilar to the original, specially, in the Movie Reviews data sets due to its
distance distribution.
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